Analysis of Cascading Failures Due to Dynamic Load-Altering Attacks

Abstract

Large-scale load-altering attacks (LAAs) are known to severely disrupt power grid operations by manipulating several internet-of-things (IoT)-enabled load devices. In this work, we analyze power grid cascading failures induced by such attacks. The inherent security features in power grids such as the $N-1$ design philosophy dictate LAAs that can trigger cascading failures are rare events. We overcome the challenge of efficiently sampling critical LAAs scenarios for a wide range of attack parameters by using the so-called ``skipping sampler’’ algorithm. We conduct extensive simulations using a three-area IEEE-39 bus system and provide several novel insights into the composition of cascades due to LAAs. Our results highlight the particular risks to modern power systems posed by strategically designed coordinated LAAs that exploit their structural and real-time operating characteristics.